Iran Reshaping Strait of Hormuz Navigation, Leveraging Conflict for Maritime Influence
An analysis by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggests Iran is establishing a new maritime reality in the Strait of Hormuz, utilizing recent military confrontations with the United States to consolidate its naval influence. The report indicates Tehran is unlikely to revert to pre-conflict navigation norms, even if diplomatic progress is achieved.
The report, authored by researcher Naom Ridan, posits that the continued transit through narrow passages, escalating Iranian warnings, threats of naval mines, and a recent drone attack on a commercial vessel collectively signal Tehran's intent to solidify new maritime arrangements that enhance its control over this critical global waterway.
Following a June 17th US-Iran understanding to de-escalate, a gradual increase in commercial vessel traffic through the Strait was observed, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a plan to evacuate ships and sailors stranded in the Arabian Gulf. However, the report emphasizes that navigation has not returned to normal, with vessel numbers significantly below pre-conflict levels and ongoing security threats, particularly from naval mines and Iranian pressure on commercial shipping.
The analysis highlights the precarious security situation, noting that while vessels initially adopted alternative routes along the Omani coast and through Iranian waters post-military operations, a recent attack on the container ship "Ever Lovely" on the Omani route, coupled with Iranian warnings against unapproved passages, demonstrates that even the Omani route is not risk-free. The IMO subsequently suspended its evacuation plan, and the crude oil tanker "Omega Trader" rerouted back into the Arabian Gulf, underscoring the persistent fragility of the security environment.
Despite a joint US-GCC statement reaffirming the importance of freedom of navigation, the report argues that on-the-ground developments indicate a breakdown of the traditional maritime order, with Iran seeking to establish new arrangements as the primary influencer of traffic management. The central question, according to the researcher, is not how Iran will return to the previous situation, but how decision-makers will address Tehran's justifications for its central role in the new maritime system and the obstacles it may place on alternative arrangements.
The report notes that commercial vessels are now avoiding the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) previously adopted by the IMO, due to suspected naval mines in the traditional Strait route. Estimates suggest approximately 80 naval mines are present, posing a significant clearance challenge. This ambiguity is expected to compel vessels to continue using the "Northern Route" through Iranian waters, which Iran's sanctioned Persian Gulf Maritime Authority has designated as the "new safe navigation route," and the "Southern Route" along the Omani coast, which has seen US-guided transits.
The IMO's plan had allowed vessels to use either temporary route in coordination with the coastal state. However, Iran declared all other routes, including the Omani one, "unacceptable" and posing "grave security risks," mandating coordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) shortly before the "Ever Lovely" attack. Ship-tracking data reveals continued use of both routes, but their capacity is insufficient to handle pre-war traffic volumes, averaging around 138 vessels daily. Shipping companies are unlikely to return to traditional routes until mines are fully cleared, given the environmental and economic risks of collisions and Iran's uncertain cooperation with international demining efforts.
Market research data supports this assessment, showing a limited recovery in tanker traffic post-accord. While daily transits increased from seven on June 17th to 32 by June 24th, they remained significantly below pre-war levels. The risk of further navigation disruptions persists, with the IRGC escalating threats. An alert from Dryad Global indicated the IRGC ordered a product tanker to halt near Larak Island, threatening missile strikes despite its transit through the Iranian route. This behavior reinforces the likelihood of continued Iranian assertiveness, particularly given the difficulty of returning to the previous navigation system and the lack of clarity regarding a potential regional mechanism for managing the Strait, including future fees.
The report concludes that Iran recognizes the strategic value of controlling navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, a leverage it is likely to use in future negotiations with Washington to solidify the new maritime order. Confronting this strategy, the report argues, requires more than political statements, urging the US and its regional partners to adopt new policies and measures to prevent Iran from monopolizing navigation rule-setting. Prioritizing clear safety and security guidance for mariners is essential, as fears of reprisal for non-compliance with IRGC directives are realistic. Acknowledging the collapse of the previous navigation system is the first step toward resolution. The report advocates for non-military tools, warning that renewed military confrontation would exacerbate the crisis and stressing the need for clear communication channels with vessels on the Omani route to manage Iranian warnings or attacks, as crews are not equipped for conflict environments.
The report identifies the public declaration of mine locations and a clear demining timeline as an urgent priority, as continued ambiguity will delay the return to normal navigation and allow Iran to solidify its preferred system. Vessels will likely continue using the northern and southern routes until the threat is fully neutralized. A new development involves Oman's proposal for future fees on pollution control and assistance services for transiting vessels, a concept also previously raised by Iran, sparking US concerns that such fees could set a precedent for other international waterways. To avoid long-term disruptions post-negotiation, any fees should be temporary, limited to requested assistance or pollution incidents, and rescinded once traditional navigation in the Strait is restored.